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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROY DRAKE IRVIN, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 2006063 8-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from two convictions for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one conviction for failure to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41 -6a-210 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was defendant entitled to have his jury convictions for aggravated robbery 
merged for punishment purposes where they were based on different acts and elements, 
and also involved different victims? 
Standard of review. Merger is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Smith, 2003 UT App 179, f 7, 72 P.3d 692. 
2. Has defendant shown that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not 
objecting to dangerous weapon enhancements and anecdotal statistical evidence? 
Standard of review. Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised for the 
first time on appeal present questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, [^ 11, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 45; State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, \ 
6, 122P.3d615. 
3. Are defendant's two enhanced first degree felony sentences of six-years-to-life 
illegal under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
Standard of review. Whether an appellate court may review the legality of a sentence 
under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, involves the interpretation of a rule, a 
legal determination. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of the following pertinent statutes are attached in addendum E. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
Utah R.Evid. 403. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, both first 
degree felony offenses, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). In the 
alternative to the second count of aggravated robbery, defendant was charged with theft, a 
second degree felony offense, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). He 
was also charged with failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony 
offense, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210 (West 2004). R29A-29C. 
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts 
of aggravated robbery, and failure to stop. R283-85; R367:54-55. 
Motion to vacate one of two convictions for aggravated robbery denied. Before 
sentencing, defendant moved to vacate one of his two convictions for aggravated robbery. 
R292-302 (a copy of the motion is attached in addendum A). Defendant asserted that his 
convictions for aggravated robbery should be merged because they were part of a single 
criminal episode with a single objective and thus constituted the "same act" for punishment 
purposes under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(1) (West 2004).1 R296-98. Defendant 
Section 76-1-402(1) provides: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution 
under any other such provision. 
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maintained this was true, even though the State pled "different 'theories' for different 
charges." R298. According to defendant, the State alleged that he "committed aggravated 
robbery by committing robbery[,] and in the course of the robbery, 1) using a dangerous 
weapon, and 2) taking an operable motor vehicle," but defendant maintained his "convictions 
should merge because there was a single crime capable of proof under multiple theories." 
R298, 300. 
The State responded that defendant misread section 76-1 -402( 1), that two separate and 
distinct aggravated robberies occurred here, and that the second aggravated robbery—the 
taking of the convenience store clerk's personal vehicle—was not merely incidental too, or 
part of the first aggravated robbery—taking cash from the convenience store register. See 
R305-12. 
The trial court heard the parties' oral argument on 11 May 2006 and denied 
defendant's motion: 
. . . I don't think the decision has to turn on whether you have one or 
two victims, or whether you have a victim who owns the money but wasn't 
there, or the property was taken from the person who had the responsibility of 
the money, an employee like in this case. I don't think the decision should turn 
on that. 
Whether there were two separate crimes that are charged separately 
even though they may be in a single criminal episode—and I look at a single 
criminal episode as just a procedural matter. Single criminal episode you try 
them all at once, if you can't you try them separately. But it seems to me the 
The complete text of section 76-1-402 is set out in addendum E. 
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better rationale has to be here that certainly a robbery has to occur, and it can 
only occur when the property is taken from a person. 
In this case we have a—we have a robbery, and [defendant] came into 
the store and he took the property that was owned by the store owner—who 
wasn't there, but under the care, custody or control of his employee who was 
there—by force or fear. I agree with the State[,] at that point in time, that 
crime ends as far as the robbery is concerned. If something had have happened 
in the back room besides just taking [the store clerk's] keys, then everybody 
agrees it would be another crime. But at that point in time, after the force and 
fear are necessary to get the cash out of the cash register is concluded, 
[defendant] takes [the store clerk] in the back room, the force and fear 
continues and she gives up the keys to her car. 
Now, granted it's the same person from whom the property was taken. 
If it wasn't, the second charge wouldn't be a robbery it would be something 
else. But her property was taken from her against her will by force or fear and 
that is her automobile. And I think that constitutes a separate crime. 
And the reason I do say that is in the circumstances of this case, and 
each case turns on its own, factually anyway, but it just seems to me once the 
initial crime is completed, the robbery—taking the money by force and 
fear—is completed and then there's a second type of property taken from—in 
this case, this is her personal property, this isn't her property that's being taken 
that she has charge of as an employee—and through force and fear, you've got 
a second crime. 
So, accordingly, I deny the defense motion. 
R368:24-26 (a complete copy of the oral argument and ruling transcript is attached as 
addendum B). The trial court's oral ruling was reduced to written findings: 
1. The defendant entered the Fastback [sic] Convenience Store in Salt Lake 
County ("the store") and held a knife against the store clerk,... ("the victim") 
to induce her to open the store cash register. The defendant then took money 
from the register that was under the victim's care and control, but which 
belonged to the store owner. 
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2. Still in possession of the knife, the defendant then told the victim to give him 
her car keys. He then took her to the back of the store, talked about tying her 
up, and told her to stay in the back of the store when he left. These 
actions—taking the victim's car keys, removing her to the back of the store, 
talking about tying her up, and telling her to stay put—were committed to 
facilitate taking the victim's personal vehicle. The defendant left the building 
and drove away in the victim's personal vehicle. 
R319 (a copy of the written ruling is attached in addendum C). Based on these findings, the 
trial court concluded that: 
1. Taking the money from the store cash register completed the first, 
separate offense of [aggravated [rjobbery. 
2, The defendant began a second, separate offense of [aggravated [rjobbery 
when he took the victim's personal car keys, removed her to the back of the 
store, talked about tying her up, and told her to stay there. When he took the 
victim's motor vehicle, the defendant completed the second, separate offense 
of [aggravated [rjobbery. 
Id. 
Sentence. On 9 June 2006, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six years 
to life for the aggravated robbery convictions, and a consecutive sentence of zero to five 
years for the failure to stop conviction. R315-17; R369:12-13. 
Timely notice of appeal and transfer order. Defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal on 3 July 2006. R324. The Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction of the appeal 
to this Court on 25 August 2006. R358. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Defendant held a knife to a convenience store clerk's neck and forced her to hand over 
(1) approximately $15000 in small bills from the store cash register, and (2) the keys to her 
personal vehicle, which he used to flee the scene. 
* * * 
On 3 July 2005, Teresa Celis worked the evening shift at the Fast Track convenience 
store in Salt Lake City, Utah. R366:94-95. Defendant entered the store three different times 
during her shift. R3 66:94-96. The first two times, defendant attempted to get cash from an 
ATM inside the store. R366:102-04. After defendant's second attempt, Teresa caught a 
glimpse of defendant's ATM card and saw that it was a Comdata card, a type used by 
professional truck drivers to buy fuel and get cash advances. R366:103-04. Defendant 
turned to Teresa and said, "My money still isn't there," and "I'll be back and give it more 
time." R366:104. 
First aggravated robbery. About twenty minutes later, defendant entered the store 
a third time, stopped at the ATM, and re-inserted his card. R366:105. Teresa went behind 
the counter while defendant was at the ATM. Id. Defendant left the ATM and approached 
the counter, asking Teresa for a pack of COOL super-long cigarettes, or COOL 100's. 
R366:105-06. When Teresa bent down to reach the cigarettes, defendant stepped to her left, 
2The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State 
v. Tiliaia, 2006 UT App 474, ^ 2 n.l, 566 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. 
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toward the gap giving access to the area behind the counter. R366:106-07; see also State's 
Exh. # 2. Then, "[a]ll of a sudden—Bam—he was right in [her] face, and he ha[d] a knife 
right in front of [her].5' R366:107. 
Defendant stood close to Teresa, held the knife approximately two feet from her face, 
and ordered her to open the cash register. R366:108. Teresa stepped back, and defendant 
repeated his demand, "No, you open the drawer." R366:108. Defendant positioned himself 
to Teresa's side, continuing to hold the knife in her face while she opened the cash drawer. 
R366:108-09. Teresa removed a pile of ones from the register, and as she handed them to 
defendant, he warned her, "Don'tyoulookatme." R366:109. Teresa then handed defendant 
a stack of fives, and all of the tens and twenties from the drawer. R366:109-10. Defendant 
took the cash from her with one hand, and each time she handed him a stack, his hand 
reappeared empty. R366:110. 
Second aggravated robbery. After obtaining the cash from the register, defendant 
turned his attention to Teresa's possessions. Id. Still wielding his knife, defendant 
demanded, "Now give me your keys." Id. When Teresa complied, defendant ordered, "Now 
we are going in the back room," which "was when [Teresa] got scared," and froze. 
R366:111. Defendant responded by telling Teresa that he was "not going to f ing hurt [her], 
but [she was] going in the back room." R366:112. As defendant guided Teresa toward the 
back room with the knife at her neck, he asked her what he could use to tie her up. 
R366:112-13. Teresa said, "Look, it's slow. Nobody is here. You got my keys. You got 
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the money. You should just go." R366:112. She turned around, and defendant told her, 
"You better f ing stay right there." R366:l 13. After Teresa promised to stay in the back 
room for five minutes, defendant exited the store and fled in Teresa's 1995 teal-green Ford 
Aspire. R366:113-14,116. Teresa estimated that around $500 or $600 had been stolen from 
the register. R366:130. The store owner later reported that $1,105 was missing. R366:181. 
Failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. Later that night, Officer Anderson 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department, was informed of the robberies. R366:143. At about 
2:00 a.m. that morning he spotted Teresa's stolen Ford Aspire, which defendant was driving 
on 200 West. R3 66:144-45. Pulling behind the car, Officer Anderson activated his overhead 
lights. R366:146. After the lights were activated, defendant accelerated and ltd Officer 
Anderson on a pursuit along several downtown streets and through a motel parking lot, 
finally entering an alley at 670 South. R366:148-49. Numerous times throughout the chase, 
defendant opened the driver-side door, but closed it without exiting. R3 66:149. When 
defendant turned onto 670 South, a dead end street, Officer Anderson thought that the pursuit 
was over. Id Defendant, however, leaped from Teresa's vehicle and led Officer Anderson 
on a foot chase, scaling a six-foot fence and dashing through the Red Lion parking lot. 
R366:150. As Officer Anderson closed the distance between them, defendant glanced over 
his shoulder and tripped over a curb along the driveway. R366:151. Unable to regain his 
balance, defendant fell forward and slid along the pavement, allowing Officer Anderson to 
take him into custody. Id. 
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After placing defendant under arrest, Officer Anderson noticed a bulge in defendant's 
sock, and recovered a roll of cash. R366:154. The cash totaled $447 in denominations of 
twenties, tens, fives, and ones. R366:171, 181. 
A subsequent search of Teresa's car yielded a pack of COOL 100's cigarettes, a small 
folding knife, and several bandanas like those sold at the store. R366:174. A search of 
defendant's person yielded a Comdata card, a CR England Trucking card, and defendant's 
temporary driver's license. R366:168; see also State's Exh. # 7. 
Defense strategy. In his opening statement, trial counsel told the jury that defendant 
fled from Officer Anderson, not because he was guilty of the aggravated robberies, but 
because he had an outstanding warrant: "[W]hy does a person do something like that? Well, 
[defendant] had a warrant out of Louisiana. He had written a bad check back home and knew 
that there was an outstanding warrant." R366:92. Thereafter, on direct examination of the 
officer, the prosecutor elicited that of the approximately "dozen" foot chases Officer 
Anderson had been involved in, the suspects "typically" claimed to have run "because they 
thought they had warrants." R366:155. On cross-examination of Officer Anderson, trial 
counsel elicited that the officer arrested defendant for "aggravated robbery, possession of a 
stolen vehicle, felony fleeing, resisting arrest[] and an NCIC hit." R366:158. Upon further 
examination, Officer Anderson affirmed that an "NCIC hit," is "the same as having a 
warrant." Id. 
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Based on Officer Anderson's testimony, the prosecutor argued that while it was true 
defendant had an outstanding warrant when he fled, that fact was merely a "convenient 
excuse": "You heard the officer testify they all say they have warrants, that's why he ran. 
I think he ran for another reason, because he was in a stolen car, because he had taken it 
earlier that night." R367:35. Trial counsel, on the other hand, maintained that defendant fled 
because of the outstanding warrant: 
[CJounsel has stated that, well, they all say they have warrants, so that's not a 
valid reason. I don't know if that's true or not, but in this case there was a 
warrant. He did have a warrant, and that's why he ran. He panicked. You 
know, I don't know what happened in other cases, but we know what 
happened in this case, he had a warrant. He had a warrant that he knew about. 
R367:36-37. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to merge his aggravated 
robbery convictions for punishment purposes. Defendant was convicted for aggravated 
robbery under two different subsections of the aggravated robbery statute. Specifically, 
count I charged defendant with robbing a convenience store using a dangerous weapon, and 
count II charged defendant with then taking the store clerk's personal vehicle, which he used 
to flee the scene. The aggravated robberies of the convenience store and of the clerk were 
thus part of a single criminal episode, as defendant claims, but they also involved different 
victims, elements, and acts, i.e., the underlying robbery, plus using a dangerous weapon, and 
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taking an automobile. Accordingly, defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery do not 
constitute the same act and they are not subject to merger for punishment purposes. 
Point 11(A). Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel for not 
objecting to dangerous weapon enhancements. The dangerous weapon enhancement statute 
comports with federal and state double jeopardy protections; therefore, as recently recognized 
by this Court, any objection to the weapon enhancement on those grounds would have been 
futile. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 45. Defendant's first 
assertion of ineffectiveness thus fails as a matter of law. 
Point 11(B). Trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to allegedly improper 
anecdotal statistical evidence. Defendant asserts on appeal that trial counsel should have 
objected to Officer Anderson's testimony—that most suspects apprehended following a foot 
chase typically claim to have fled because they had warrants. Although trial counsel did not 
object to the evidence, he did strategically argue in closing that the jury in this case knew for 
a fact that defendant had an outstanding warrant when he fled. Moreover, defendant, opened 
the door to Officer Anderson's testimony when trial counsel asserted in his opening 
statement that defendant fled because he had a warrant, not because he was guilty of the 
charged offenses. Defendant does not assert that the this strategy was unreasonable. Rather, 
he acknowledges in his brief that trial counsel's argument was strategic, or to show that 
defendant "had a reason to flee from police other than guilt." Aplt. Br. at 38. Given the 
defense strategy, the prosecutor was entitled to adduce evidence that would minimize the 
12 
effect of defendant's evidence. Officer Anderson's testimony was therefore unobj ectionable. 
Defendant's claim of deficient performance for not objecting to the testimony therefore fails 
as a matter of law. 
Even if Officer Anderson's testimony should have been excluded, defendant has not 
and cannot establish unfair prejudice. The jury did not convict here because of Officer 
Anderson's testimony, but rather because defendant matched the description of the robber 
and was apprehended driving the store clerk's stolen vehicle. He was also found in 
possession of almost $500 in small bills and other items like those taken from the 
convenience store. Thus, defendant cannot establish the second, or prejudice prong of the 
ineffectiveness standard and his claim should therefore be rejected. 
Point III. Defendant's claim of an illegal sentence fails because in claiming that his 
aggravated robbery convictions should have merged, defendant is really challenging the 
underlying convictions and not the sentences given thereon. Therefore, there is no issue of 
an illegal sentence in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE TWO JURY 
CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY MERGED FOR 
PUNISHMENT PURPOSES, BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON 
DIFFERENT ACTS AND ELEMENTS, AND INVOLVED DIFFERENT 
VICTIMS 
In Point I of his brief, defendant alleges that his felony convictions for aggravated 
robbery of the (1) convenience store, and of (2) the store clerk, Teresa Celis, should be 
merged. Aplt. Br. at 14 ("This Court should merge [defendant's] aggravated robbery 
convictions") (holding and capitalization omitted). In defendant's view, "the two aggravated 
robbery charges stemmed from a single criminal episode," and were also "'incident to the 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, namely to [rob the convenience store] and 
avoid being caught.'" Aplt. Br. at 17 (quoting State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 
1990) (brackets in original)).3 Defendant thus opines that the aggravated robberies 
constituted "a single act conducted with a single intent," Aplt. Br. at 18, for which he "could 
only be prosecuted once" under the single criminal episode statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1 -
402(1) (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 17. In other words, defendant alleges he was charged, 
3Defendant borrows language from the Lopez opinion, but that case does not 
involve merging separate convictions for purposes of punishment as defendant requests. 
Rather, the issue in Lopez was whether the trial court should have granted Lopez's 
motion to sever charges of murder and child abuse. 789 P.2d at 42-44. The Court held 
that the offenses were properly joined in a single prosecution. Id. 
14 
convicted, and punished twice for the same offense.4 Because the evidence here clearly 
shows that defendant committed two different acts that required proof of different elements, 
and thus constituted two different offenses, his claim lacks merit and should be rejected. 
Single criminal episode statute. The single criminal episode statute, or section 76-1-
402(1) provides that 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision . . . 5 
There is no dispute here that the State relied upon separate acts to convict defendant for the 
aggravated robberies of the convenience store and of the store clerk. However, defendant 
asserts that he acted "with a single intent" in committing these acts, and therefore, "there was 
'one offense and the multiple ownership of the property taken is immaterial.5" Aplt. Br. at 
18. Defendant's claim is foreclosed by State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,72 P.3d 69, where 
4To the extent that defendant hints that he is entitled to relief under the state and 
federal constitutions, see Aplt. Br. at 14, his claims are unpreserved because he asserted 
neither constitution in the trial court. See R292-302 (motion and memorandum); R367:57 
(oral motion); R368 (motion hearing). See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^ 14,122 
P.3d 506 ("[W]e are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not 
been properly preserved, framed, and briefed."), rev'don other grounds, 124 S.Ct. 1943 
(2006). Moreover, defendant asserts no exception to the preservation rule. See State v. 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 23, 128 P.3d 1171 (refusing to infer a plain error argument); State 
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same). 
5UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601(1) (West 2004), defines "Act" as "a voluntary 
bodily movement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401 (West 2004), defines a "single criminal 
episode" as "all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
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this Court clarified that the single criminal episode statute, section 76-1-402(1), "applies" 
only "to cases where 'the same acf can be punished under different provisions.'55 Smith, 
2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692, \ 19. Where, as here, however, separate acts require proof 
of different elements they constitute separate offenses under section 76-1-402(1). Smith, 
2003 UT App 179420(discussing^atev.^wa^z,736P.2d 1040,1041 (UtahApp. 1987)). 
In other words, a defendant may be prosecuted and punished for all crimes committed within 
a single criminal episode so long as they each arise from separate acts. See State v. O'Brien, 
721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986) (referring to the first paragraph of section 76-1-402(1)). See 
also State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (holding that "[t]he provision in 
section 76-1-402(1) against double punishment for a single act [was] inapplicable55 where 
Porter committed "two distinct burglaries55 (laundry room and apartment in the same 
building), albeit "during a single criminal episode55). Cf. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
Tf 16, 994 P.2d 1243 (clarifying that "the inquiry whether one crime is a lesser included 
offense of a greater crime under section 76-l-402[(3)(a)], turns on the statutorily defined 
elements of the two crimes55). 
Aggravated robbery statute. A review of the aggravated robbery statute, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-302(1) (West 2004), demonstrates that the offense can be committed three 
different ways: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing a robbery, 
he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; 
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(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.6 
Defendant was charged and convicted under subsections (l)(a) and (l)(c): Count I charged 
defendant with using a knife to rob the convenience store of its cash, see section 76-6-
3 02( 1)(a), and Count II charged defendant with then taking the store clerk's personal vehicle, 
see section 76-6-3 02(1 )(c). The distinction between the charges was made clear in the 
information as well as throughout the trial and in closing argument. See, e.g., R29A-29C, 
R251-52,R367:33-34. 
Based on the above, even assuming the aggravated robberies of the convenience store 
and of the store clerk were part of a single criminal episode, they were also separate and 
distinct acts involving different victims and elements, i.e., the underlying robbery of the 
convenience store, plus using or threatening the use of a knife, and taking an automobile. 
See section 76-1-601; 76-6-302(l)(a) & (c); see also O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 900 (rejecting 
defendants claims that because their crimes of aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated robbery, and theft of firearms were committed during a single criminal episode 
they were only subject to one punishment). As such, the aggravated robberies of the 
convenience store and of Teresa Celis constitute distinct and separate offenses that are not 
6UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 (West 2004) defines robbery as an "unlawfiil[] and 
[intentional[] tak[ing] or attemt[ed] tak[ing of] personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or 
fear, and with a purpose of intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the 
personal property;55 or an "intentional[] or knowing[] use[] [of] fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.55 
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subject to merger forpunishment purposes under section 76-1-402(1). See, e.g., Smith, 2003 
UT App 179, Tff 19-20 (holding Smith's convictions for (1) failure to file a tax return and (2) 
willful evasion of income tax were separate acts requiring proof of different elements and 
constituted separate offenses not subject to merger under section 76-1-402(1)); State v. 
Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1989) (holding Mane's conduct in shooting and killing 
first victim, firing at a second victim, and then turning and running, and stopping to fire at 
a third victim, were distinct voluntary acts not subject to merger); Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040, 
1042 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that when Suarez "placed his mouth on the victim's 
breasts," "and then placed his hand on her vagina," he committed two separate acts requiring 
proof of different elements under the forcible sexual abuse statute, which acts thus 
constituted separate offenses). 
Defendant's authorities are not to the contrary. Defendant cites, among other cases, 
State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), andStote v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), 
in support of his claim that his convictions for aggravated robbery amount to a single 
criminal violation for punishment purposes. Kimbel and Crosby, however, apply the single 
larceny rule, a merger doctrine adopted by the Utah Supreme Court and other courts that in 
theft cases, there is only one offense if there is only "one intention, one general impulse, and 
one plan, even though there is a series of transactions." Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518 (two thefts 
of same type of property on same day from same victim constituted single offense); Crosby, 
927 P.2d at 645-46 (three counts of theft consolidated where defendant's thefts were part of 
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a single plan; but separate forgery count left standing); People v. Bailey, 360 P.2d 39, 42 
(Cal. 1961). The purpose of the single larceny rule, which has not been extended beyond 
theft or embezzlement cases, "is to prevent the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single 
act and stems from the presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of the 
penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment." State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 
696 (Utah 1981) (holding prosecution could not aggregate sixteen counts of misdemeanor 
vandalism into a single felony offense); see also State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,390 (Utah 
App. 1997). In Patience, this Court refused to apply the single larceny rule to forgery cases 
even if the forgeries were committed in the course of a continuous transaction, holding 
instead that a defendant could be convicted for each document forged. Id. at 390-91. 
Indeed, while the Supreme Court in Crosby required the theft charges in that case to be 
consolidated, it did not preclude the separate conviction of a single forgery charge, even 
though it appears the objective was the same, i.e., to misappropriate company funds. See 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645-46. In short, the single larceny rule is a narrow exception to section 
76-1 -402. Defendant has not demonstrated that the exception is warranted in this aggravated 
robbery context. 
Defendant alternatively asserts that even assuming that the single larceny rule does 
not require merger of his aggravated robbery convictions, "there was only one victim of an 
act of violence"—Teresa Celis—and therefore "there was only one offense." Aplt. Br. at 
19. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition that only persons who suffer an act of 
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violence constitute victims under the aggravated robbery statute, and the State is aware of 
none. To the contrary, the sentencing statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-20l(l)(e)(i) (West 
2004), defines a "victim" as "any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." See also UTAH CODE ANN. 77-
38a-102(14)(a) (West 2004) (Crime Victims Restitution Act applying same definition). 
Thus, while the convenience store owner was not personally present at the time of the 
aggravated robberies, he is nonetheless a victim of defendant's criminal activity for purposes 
of charging and punishing defendant. 
In sum, defendant committed two separate voluntary acts when he robbed the 
convenience store using a dangerous weapon anddlso took the store clerk's personal vehicle. 
These separate acts required proof of different elements, in addition to the underlying 
robbery: (1) use of a dangerous weapon, and (2) taking of an operable motor vehicle. Section 
76-6-302(l)(a) & (c). They thus constitute separate offenses under section 76-6-302(l)(a) 
& (c), as well as separate acts under sections 76-1-601 and 76-1-402(1). Accordingly, 
defendant fails to show that his aggravated robbery convictions should have been merged for 
punishment purposes under section 76-1-402(1). 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT TRIAL COUNSEL 
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR NOT OBJECTING 
TO DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENTS AND TO 
ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER ANECDOTAL STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
raising federal and state double jeopardy objections to the dangerous weapon enhancements 
imposed under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 19-34. In Point 
11(B) of his brief, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
Officer Anderson's testimony that in the officer's experience, suspects apprehended 
following a foot chase typically claim to have run because they thought they had warrants. 
Aplt. Br. at 34-39. Both of defendant's claims lack merit and should be rejected. 
Ineffective assistance standard. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant "must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that 
it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984)). Defendant must also "show that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. The first part of defendant's 
burden requires that he "rebut the strong presumption that 'under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'"Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689) (other internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If defendant fails to 
establish either deficient performance or prejudice, his claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel fails as a matter of law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993). "Given 
the arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely 
succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). 
A. Utah's dangerous weapon enhancement statute comports 
with federal and state double jeopardy protections; 
therefore, as recently recognized in State v. Alfatlawi, any 
objection on those grounds would have been futile. 
"To establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law, 
a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the 
time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). In other words, counsel's performance must be assessed on his 
"perspective at the time." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,523 (2003) (quotation and citation 
omitted). "[CJlairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation." Bullock v. 
Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1093 (2002) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). Thus, counsel cannot be found to have performed deficiently 
"for failing to predict future law." Id. Yet, that is precisely what defendant asserts his trial 
counsel failed to do when he raised no double jeopardy objections to the dangerous weapon 
enhancements in this case. Aplt. Br. at 19-39. 
On 21 December 2006, ten days after defendant filed his brief on appeal, this Court 
issued State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ffif 37-44, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 45. See Aplt. 
Br. at 41 (mailing certificate signed 11 December 2006). Alfatlawi, also an ineffectiveness 
case, upholds the dangerous weapon enhancement statute against the same claims of double 
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jeopardy defendant now asserts his trial counsel should have raised in this case. 2006 UT 
App 511, fflf 37-43. Given the result in Alfatlawi, trial counsel can hardly be faulted for his 
non-objection to the dangerous weapon enhancements in this case. Id. at U 43. 
Indeed, Alfatlawi, like defendant, was convicted for aggravated robbery (six counts).7 
2006 UT App 511, f 8. On appeal, Alfatlawi, like defendant, asserted that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object—on federal and state double jeopardy grounds—to the 
dangerous weapon enhancements imposed under section 76-3-203.8. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT 
App 511, \ 37. This Court rejected Alfatlawi's claims, holding that section 76-3-203.8 did 
not violate federal double jeopardy protections. Id. at f 39. As recognized by the Court, at 
sentencing, the "Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court 
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Id. (quoting Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). The Court further noted that "in Hunter, the United 
States Supreme Court determined that dangerous weapon enhancement statutes do not violate 
the Fifth Amendment^ . . . if the legislature specifically authorized cumulative punishment 
for a crime committed with a dangerous weapon." Id. Turning to the plain language of 
section 76-3-203.8, the Court held that it was consistent with federal double jeopardy law 
because the legislature clearly intended for the dangerous weapon enhancement to impose 
cumulative punishments. Id. at \ 40. "[T]he plain language of section 76-3-203.8 states that 
' [i]f the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in 
7Alfatlawi was also convicted for one count of aggravated burglary. Id. at f 8. 
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the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court . . . shall increase by one year the 
minimum term of the sentence applicable by law.'" Id. (quoting section 76-3-203.8(2)) 
(brackets in original). This Court recognized that "this language unambiguously states that 
the legislature intended to make it mandatory for trial courts to increase prison terms where 
the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a dangerous weapon 
while committing a felony."Id. Consequently, the Court determined that section 76-3-203.8 
comports with federal double jeopardy law. Id. 
This Court further held that even assuming that the language of section 76-3-203.8 
was ambiguous, the legislative history supported the conclusion that the dangerous weapon 
enhancement did not violate federal double jeopardy law. As noted, at sentencing, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause requires only that the legislative "intent [was] to authorize 
cumulative punishment for a single act." Id. at \ 41. Here, review of the legislative history 
expressly showed that the "purpose of the legislation was to assist law enforcement and 'get[] 
tougher on violent criminals' by increasing prison terms." Id. (quoting Floor Debate on H.B. 
185, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bresnahan)).8 
8The legislative floor debates show that changing the word "firearm" to 
"dangerous weapon" only "broaden[ed] the ability of our law enforcement people to deal 
with the ever-increasing problem of violent crime." Recording of the proceeding of the 
49th Legislature, presentation of H.B. 185 to Utah House, Day 44, February 28, 1995 
(transcribed by Lee Nakamura, secretary Utah Attorney General's Office) (Addendum 
D). Rep. Bresnahan further explained that "dangerous weapon" depended on "the way the 
weapon is used." Id. "So, in other words, 'a dangerous weapon,' for those that have had 
concerns, is not just simply that you've got a pocketknife in your pocket, it depends on 
how you use it. So, anything could be 4a dangerous weapon' if you use it as such." Id. 
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Finally, this Court held that section 76-3-203.8 also comported with state double 
jeopardy protections as well. Id. at %A2 (citing UTAH CONST, art. I5 § 12). Although Utah's 
"double jeopardy clause has been interpreted differently than the Fifth Amendment's double 
jeopardy clause, [the Court] could find no authority distinguishing Utah law from federal law 
respecting cumulative sentences." Id. The Court further noted that the Utah Supreme Court 
had previously upheld "cumulative punishment on crimes committed with firearms[.]" Id. 
(discussing State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah 1978) and the former firearm 
enhancement statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (1978)). This Court thus reached the 
same conclusion with regard to "the current dangerous weapon enhancement statute," section 
76-3-203.8. Id.9 
Having determined that section 76-3-203.8 comports with both federal and state 
double jeopardy protections, the Court concluded that Alfatlawi's trial counsel "did not 
perform ineffectively for failing to challenge the enhancement." Id. at % 43. The Court 
expressly rejected Alfatlawi's characterization of the double jeopardy issue as an "open 
question,"—the same characterization asserted by defendant here—on the ground that "[t]he 
9In holding that the dangerous weapon enhancement did not violate state double 
jeopardy protections, the Court expressly rejected Alfatlawi's invitation—the same as that 
of defendant in this case—to "adopt the analysis of the Montana Supreme Court in State 
v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312 (Mont. 1999)." Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, % 42 n.5. In 
addition to emphasizing that it was not bound to follow a sister state court, the Court 
expressly rejected the Montana rationale in favor of that of the United States Supreme 
Court. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 42 n.5 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366). 
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cases governing double jeopardy in Utah are well settled." Id. at ^ f 43 n.6 (citations omitted). 
Because Alfatlawi failed to show any deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel, 
the Court determined there was no need to consider the second or prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance analysis. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 43. 
In sum, if as Alfatlawi instructs, federal and state double jeopardy law was well-
settled before to Alfatlawi, it is even more well-settled after Alfatlawi. Accordingly, 
defendant's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise futile double 
jeopardy objections identical to those disposed of m Alfatlawi should be rejected. See State 
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, | 34, 989 P.2d 52 ("The failure of counsel to make motions or 
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance" 
(quotations, citation, and alteration omitted)). If Alfatlawi's trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently, trial counsel here did not. 
B. The defense strategy was to argue that defendant fled 
because he had a warrant, not because he was guilty of the 
charged offenses; therefore, any objection to Officer 
Anderson's testimony that ninety percent of suspects claim 
to flee because of warrants would have been futile. 
As noted above, defendant also claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by not objecting to Officer Anderson's testimony—that suspects apprehended 
following a foot chase typically claim to have fled because they had warrants. Aplt. Br. at 
34-39; see also R366:155. According to defendant, Officer Anderson's testimony constituted 
"foundationless anecdotal statistical evidence," and was thus inadmissible under rule 403, 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), and State v. Iorg, 801 
P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1990). Aplt. Br. at 38; see also Aplt. Br. at 35-36. Defendant further 
asserts that there was "no strategic reason for allowing the State to admit the anecdotal 
statistical testimony without qualifying Officer Anderson as an expert, providing any 
foundation, or demonstrating how the probative value of the evidence could possibly 
outweigh its prejudicial effect." Aplt. Br. at 37 (citing R366:155).10 Defendant's claim lacks 
merit and should be rejected. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to object, a defendant 
bears the burden of demonstrating that "'no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be 
surmised from counsel's actions.'" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d461,468 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing State v. Moritzky, 111 P.3d 688,692 (Utah App. 1989)). "Moreover,'[the reviewing 
court] will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed 
those choices might appear in retrospect.'" Id. at 465 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
Where "a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or 
has led the trial court into error, we will then decline to save that party from the error.'" State 
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 3421-43 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah 1989)) (refusing to consider plain error claim). See also State v. Jiminez, 2007 UT 
10Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." 
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App 116,1ffi 11-12, P.3d (concluding trial counsel's non-objection was reasonable 
strategy and refusing to consider plain error claim). 
1. No deficient performance. Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for not objecting to Officer Anderson's alleged "foundationless anecdotal statitstical 
evidence," Aplt. Br. at 38, fails at the outset because trial counsel strategically chose to deal 
with this evidence in his argument to the jury. As set out in the Statement of the Facts, supra, 
trial counsel argued in closing that whatever the prosecutor may think about why defendant 
fled, defendant really did have an outstanding warrant when he fled from police the night of 
the aggravated robberies: 
[C]ounsel has stated that, well, they all say they have warrants, so that's not a 
valid reason. I don't know if that's true or not, but in this case there was a 
warrant. He did have a warrant, and that's why he ran. He panicked. You 
know, I don't know what happened in other cases, but we know what 
happened in this case, he had a warrant. He had a warrant that he knew about. 
R367:36-37. 
The record thus shows that trial counsel made a conscious decision to not object to 
Officer Anderson's testimony as part of a reasonable trial strategy to explain to the jury why 
defendant fled from police. That strategy was supported by the fact that defendant, in fact, 
had an outstanding warrant. See R366:158. Given this strategy, counsel had no reason to 
object to anecdotal information that most suspects claim to have outstanding warrants when 
they are apprehended following a chase. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468, 465. Trial 
counsel's argument was also consistent with the trial court's jury instruction that although 
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"consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt 
of the crime charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence." 
R275. 
Additionally, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness fails because defendant opened the 
door to the challenged evidence. In his opening statement, trial counsel told the jury that 
defendant fled because he had an outstanding Louisiana warrant, not because he was guilty 
of the aggravated robberies. See R366:92. The prosecutor responded by eliciting that ninety 
percent of the suspects Officer Anderson had arrested following a foot chase claimed to have 
run because of warrants. R366:155. As noted above, on cross-examination, trial counsel 
elicited that one of the reasons Officer Anderson arrested defendant in this case was because 
defendant, in fact, had an outstanding warrant. R366:158. As defendant acknowledges in 
his brief, trial counsel did so in order to argue to the jury that "he had a reason to flee from 
police other than guilt." Aplt. Br. at 38 (citing R366:92; R367:36-37). Accordingly, as 
further noted above, in closing, trial counsel argued that he didn't know about all the other 
suspects apprehended by Officer Anderson, "but in this case there was a warrant." R367:36. 
Trial counsel emphasized that the jury knew defendant had an outstanding warrant, and that 
that was the reason defendant fled from Officer Anderson. Id. at 36-37. 
Given this record, even if trial counsel had obj ected that Officer Anderson's testimony 
regarding ninety percent of apprehended suspects was "foundationless anecdotal statistical 
evidence," Aplt. Br. at 38, as defendant now claims he should have done, that objection 
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would have been unsuccessful. Defendant claims that trial counsel should have objected 
under rule 403, Rammel, and Iorg. Aplrt. Br. at 35-36. In both Rammel and Iorg, the 
defendants were convicted for sexual child abuse, and the concern was that the challenged 
witnesses "used [their] 'anecdotal statistical experience' with late reporting in sexual abuse 
cases to conclude that late reporting does not mean a victim is not telling the truth." Iorg, 801 
P.2d at 941 (discussing Rammel). Even assuming arguendo that Officer Anderson's 
testimony was objectionable under Rammel and Iorg, however, trial counsel still would not 
have been successful in raising any objection under these cases, or under rule 403, because 
trial counsel opened the door to the officer's testimony.11 
Specifically, when trial counsel asserted that defendant fled because of an outstanding 
Louisiana warrant, see R366:92, he necessarily invited the prosecutor's subsequent elicitation 
of evidence that ninety percent of apprehended suspects claim to have fled because of 
warrants, see R366:155. "It is proper to allow . . . any testimony which would tend to 
nIn any event, Officer Anderson's testimony was not objectionable under 
Rammel, Iorg, or rule 403. This is because Officer Anderson related his experience with 
the claim of warrants made by suspects apprehended following a foot chase, but unlike 
the witnesses in Rammel and Iorg, he was not asked to opine whether he had concluded 
that claim meant the suspects had fabricated the reason for their flight, or more 
specifically, that defendant was fabricating the excuse here. See R366:155. Rather, in 
this case, the prosecutor drew this reasonable inference from Officer Anderson's 
testimony in argument to the jury, see R367:35, which argument defendant does not 
challenge. See Aplt. Br. at 34-39. As set for above, defendant responded with an 
argument of his own. R366:36-37. Having failed to establish that Officer Anderson's 
testimony was objectionable under Rammel or Iorg, defendant necessarily fails to 
establish that it was prejudicial under rule 403. 
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dispute, explain or minimize the effect of evidence that has been given by one's opponent." 
State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, f 18, 136 P.3d 1261 (quoting State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 
2d 354,496 P.2d 270,274 (1972)). Therefore, because trial counsel asserted that defendant 
fled because of a warrant, and not because he was guilty, see R366:92, the prosecutor was 
entitled to "minimize" the argument by eliciting evidence that defendant's claim was one 
made by most suspects apprehended following a chase. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, ^18. 
Officer Anderson's testimony was thus admissible here, even assuming that it was otherwise 
objectionable: 
The law wisely permits evidence not otherwise admissible to be offered to 
explain or rebut evidence elicited by the defendant himself. Where one party 
introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is 
entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though 
such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered 
initially. 
State v. Norman, 562 S.E.2d 453, 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quotation marks and case 
citation omitted). 
Moreover, as recently recognized by this Court, relevant and probative evidence is not 
properly excluded under rule 403 merely on the ground that it is also prejudicial: 
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the 
party against whom it is offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given 
a more specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, 
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror. 
Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84,17, P.3d (quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 
981, 984 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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Officer Anderson's testimony was highly probative of the defense strategy to 
emphasize that defendant had an outstanding warrant when he fled. Officer Anderson's 
testimony did not contain any information that "would likely create feelings of 'bias, 
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror,' in the fact finder, or information that 
would otherwise shift the fact finder's attention away" from resolving the case, i.e., 
determining whether the State had shown defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
Even if there was a "remote possibility" that the officer's testimony would have led the jury 
to render a decision on an improper basis, that possibility still would not have been a basis 
for exclusion: "The mere fact that evidence possesses a tendency to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis does not require exclusion; evidence may be excluded only if the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the proffered evidence." Id. 
at Tf 8 (quoting Maurer, 110 P.2d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). 
Given all of the above, particularly the reasonable defense strategy to emphasize 
defendant's warrant, it necessarily follows that trial counsel would not have succeeded in 
excluding Officer Anderson's testimony under Rammel, Iorg, or rule 403. The officer's 
testimony had high probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
any unfair prejudice. See Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, ^ 7-8. Because the defense 
strategy necessarily opened the door to Officer Anderson's testimony, any objection would 
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have been futile.12 Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34. Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness thus 
fails as a matter of law. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ffl[ 16-17. 
2. No prejudice. In any event, even assuming Officer Anderson's testimony should 
have been excluded here, defendant fails to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice. 
Defendant was not convicted because Officer Anderson testified that ninety percent of 
suspects apprehended following a foot chase claim to have run because of warrants. Rather, 
the jury convicted defendant because he fit the description of the robber, a^dbecause he was 
apprehended driving the clerk's stolen automobile. R366:l 14, 151. He was also found in 
possession of $447 in denominations of twenties, tens, fives, and ones, a Comdata card, a CR 
England Trucking card, a pack of COOL 100's cigarettes, a small folding knife, and several 
bandanas like those sold at the store. R366:168, 171, 174, 181; see also State's Exh. # 7. 
Accordingly, defendant fails to show that there was a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome absent Officer Anderson's testimony. He thus fails to meet the second, or prejudice, 
prong of the ineffectiveness standard. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, *[fl[ 16-17. 
12Although defendant challenges trial counsel's non-objection to Officer 
Anderson's testimony, he does not challenge the reasonableness of the defense strategy of 
emphasizing that he in fact had an outstanding warrant. See Aplt. Br. at 38. ("In order to 
prove his defense, [defendant] took the enormous gamble of introducing evidence of his 
outstanding warrant. R366:158 . . . Because he knew he had an outstanding warrant, he 
had a reason to flee from police other than guilt" (case citation omitted)). According to 
defendant, "the State robbed [him] of the force of his gamble by introducing 
foundationaless anecdotal statistical evidence to suggest [that he] must have been lying 
about the reason he fled[.]" Aplt. Br. at 38-39. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES ARE NOT ILLEGAL UNDER RULE 
22(e), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the Court should reverse "the trial 
court's imposition of the dangerous weapon enhancements" because they "resulted in an 
illegal sentence." Aplt. Br. at 39 (capitalization and holding omitted). Defendant claims that 
his two enhanced first degree felony sentences of six-years-to-life for his aggravated robbery 
convictions violate the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitute, because, 
as he claimed in Point I of his brief, the two aggravated robberies should merge under section 
76-1-402(1). Aplt. Br. at 39. Defendant asserts that the alleged sentencing errors should be 
corrected pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Br. at 39. 
Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5, 48 P.3d 
228 (noting that "because an illegal sentence is void," a rule 22(e) claim "may be raised at 
any time") (citation omitted and internal punctuation omitted). However, in State v. Brooks, 
908 P.2d 856, 859, (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court held that "an appellate court may 
not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the substance of the appeal is, as 
it is here, a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction." Brooks, 
like defendant, challenged his sentences on the ground that "'his convictions for robbery and 
burglary illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime.'" Id. (brackets in original) 
(quotingState v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823-26 (Utah App. 1994)). Because defendant, like 
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Brooks before him, alleges that his underlying convictions for aggravated robbery should 
merge, he is substantively challenging those convictions and not his sentences. Accordingly, 
rule 22(e) does not apply. Id. Defendant's enhanced sentences should therefore be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of 
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _//_ April 2007. 
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ALLAN & EASTON, LLC 
NYALC. BODILY #9621 
1892 North 1120 West 
Provo, UT 84604 
(801) 375-8800 
(801) 375-8802 (fax) 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO VACATE 
: CONVICTION FOR 
Plaintiff, AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Case No. 051904377 
ROY DRAKE IRVIN JR, : JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel of record Nyal C. Bodily and hereby 
moves the Court to vacate Defendant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery, found in Count Two 
of the Information filed against Defendant. Defendant's motion is based on the accompanying 
memorandum. Defendant moves the Court to vacate the conviction on Count Two of the 
information for the reason that the convictions for Counts One and Two are properly subject to 
merger pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-1-402 and Utah caselaw. 
3y 
FILE® msmiGT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 10 2006 
DePuty CtSriT 
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the Court for a finding that Counts One and Two of the 
information filed in this case are subject to the Merger Doctrine and an order that Defendant's 
conviction for Count Two-Aggravated Robbery be vacated. 
DATED April 7, 2006. 
OL: 
Nyal 6; Bodily 
ALLAN & EASTON, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Suiane Voyles, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Vacate Conviction for Aggravated Robbery and Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Vacate to: 
George Vo-Duc 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
t^h DATED this 10m day of April 2006. 
JflOL 
,e Voyles 
AN & EAST' 
ALLAN & EASTON, LLC 
NYALC. BODILY #9621 
1892 North 1120 West 
Provo, UT 84604 
(801)375-8800 
(801) 375-8802 (fax) 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
: AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
: VACATE CONVICTION 
vs. Case No. 051904377 
ROY DRAKE IRVIN, JR., : JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defendant. : 
Comes now Defendant, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Vacate Conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In an Amended Information filed July 7, 2005, Defendant was charged as follows: 
Count One - Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. 
§76-6-302, 
^n^ 
T^d Judicial District 
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Count Two - Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. 
§76-6-302, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
Count Two - Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404, 
Count Three - Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree 
felony, in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-210. 
2. At the preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over on all charges and the case 
set for trial. 
3. At the jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts, including Count Two -
Aggravated Robbery. The jury was not instructed on the alternate theory of Theft, 
the Court having found that there was no evidence to establish that a theft 
occurred separate and distinct from the Aggravated Robbery. 
4. After the jury returned "Guilty" verdicts on all counts, Defendant moved the 
Court to merge Counts One and Two. The Court allowed the parties to brief the 
issue. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY ARE 
SUBJECT TO MERGER BECAUSE THE CHARGES AROSE FROM A 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery are subject to merger because the 
charges arise from a single criminal episode. U.C.A. §76-1-401 defines a "single criminal 
Vb 
episode" as, "all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Further, U.C.A. §76-1-402 provides that, 
"A defendant may by prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision . . . " 
In this case, the crimes with which Defendant is charged arose from a single criminal episode 
because Defendant's conduct in the two charges of Aggravated Robbery were closely related in 
time and incident to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Indeed, at trial the evidence presented showed that Defendant had contact with only one 
person during the course of the robbery: Teresa Celis. Ms. Celis was ordered at knife point to 
hand over the cash in the register and was then told to give up the keys to her car. After being 
told to wait in the back room, Ms. Celis heard her car being driven away from the store where 
she was working. The evidence presented showed that Defendant entered the store on foot, took 
the money and then left in Ms. Celis' car. The evidence further showed that there was no break 
in the sequence of events from the taking of the money to the taking of the car. The scenario 
presented is so common that it strains reason to contend that the acts charged do not amount to a 
single criminal episode, where there was a single criminal objective. 
In State v. Bair, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether subsequent theft by 
receiving prosecutions of a defendant who possessed stolen firearms belonging to two different 
victims was permissible in light of the "single criminal episode" statute. The court found that the 
crimes alleged against the defendant charged him with receiving stolen property and that the 
receipt of the weapons had occurred in a single act. The court concluded that, "In light of the 
aforestated facts, we conclude that the offenses allegedly committed by defendant for which he 
was prosecuted in the first and second (present) prosecutions were closely related in time and 
pursuant to a single criminal objective. Accordingly, we hold that the present prosecution is 
precluded by the single criminal episode statute." 671 P.2d 203 at 208 (1983). In Bair, the 
prosecution charged the defendant under the theory that where there were two victims and two 
firearms, the defendant could be charged with two crimes. The Supreme Court's reasoning in 
denying the State's claim is applicable here. There was a single criminal episode with a single 
criminal objective and therefore while there are offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of the code, there should only be one count of Aggravated 
Robbery for which Defendant is to be punished. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY ARE 
SUBJECT TO MERGER BECAUSE ALTHOUGH THE STATE HAS PLEAD 
DIFFERENT "THEORIES" FOR DIFFERENT CHARGES THERE WAS 
REALLY A SINGLE CRIME SUBJECT TO TWO METHODS OF PROOF. 
Defendant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery should merge because although the 
State plead different legal theories as separate charges, there was a single crime committed, 
which was subject to two methods of proof. Specifically, the State alleged in this case that 
Defendant committed aggravated robbery by committing robbery and in the course of the 
robbery 1) using a dangerous weapon, and 2) taking an operable motor vehicle. In State v. 
Casias, the Court of Appeals examined a similar situation where the defendant was charged with 
theft for stealing money with a value over $1000 and for stealing a firearm. 772 P.2d 975 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). In Casias, the court ordered that one of the theft convictions be vacated. The 
court reasoned that U.C.A. §76-6-412 (the section categorizing theft for sentencing purposes 
based on the value of the thing stolen or the nature of the thing stolen (either a motor vehicle or a 
firearm)) did not outline elements of the crime of theft found at U.C.A. §76-6-404. IcL, at 978. In 
Casias, the court examined several cases and statutes and found that in each case there were 
separate and distinct elements, which had to be proved for each crime. The court also rejected the 
State's attempt to analogize U.C.A. §76-6-412 to U.C.A. §76-5-404 (forcible sexual abuse). Id,, 
at 978. 
The charging scheme in this case is similar to that examined in Casias. Here, Defendant 
was charged with the base crime of Robbery, which may be enhanced for sentencing purposes to 
a first-degree felony when any of three aggravating factors are present, i.e. a) use or threatened 
use of a dangerous weapon, b) causing serious bodily injury upon another, or c) the taking or 
attempted taking of an operable motor vehicle. Given the evidence presented at trial, the State 
had the choice of theories under which to prove that Defendant committed Aggravated Robbery, 
either of which could have properly resulted in a conviction. However, the essential underlying 
act was the robbery; the taking of personal property from another, with the intent to deprive the 
person of the property, by the use of force or fear of force. Aggravated Robbery, then, permits 
enhancement of the penalty for Robbery based on the character of the property taken or the 
manner in which it was taken. 
Therefore, Defendant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery should merge because there 
was a single crime capable of proof under multiple theories. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO MERGER BECAUSE 
THE COMMISSION OF ONE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS 
INCIDENTAL TO AND PART OF THE OTHER AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Finally, Defendant's convictions should merge because the commission of one 
aggravated robbery was incidental to the other aggravated robbery (if indeed there were two 
robberies). Specifically, Defendant applies the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), to justify the merger of the two counts of 
Aggravated Robbery in this case. Finlayson, though not directly analogous to the facts of this 
case, dealt with merger of charges of rape or forcible sodomy with aggravated kidnapping, where 
the alleged kidnapping was merely incidental to the host charge. The court in Finlayson 
developed a three part test to determine if the above-mentioned charges should merge. 
Specifically, the court stated that, 
"If a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of 
another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement for confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes 
the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk 
of detection. " I d at 289. 
If we extend the reasoning of the Finlayson test and apply it generally to the facts of this 
case we can draw several conclusions that favor merger of the Aggravated Robbery counts. First, 
for a "taking" alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be a 
separate crime, all parts of the Finlayson test must apply. Looking at part (b) of the test, certainly 
the taking of a vehicle to facilitate a robbery is inherent in the nature of a robbery, as it is 
anticipated in the Aggravated Robbery section. Also, a review of part (c) favors merger in this 
case. The taking of a vehicle does not make the commission of the underlying robbery easier nor 
does it lessen the risk of detention. Where a victim is left at the scene, as in this case, and is not 
bound or restrained in any way and the vehicle is identifiable because it was taken from the 
victim, the risk of detection to the defendant is greater than if the defendant had used his own or 
another vehicle or left the scene on foot. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery should merge and Count 2 be vacated. 
The acts for which Defendant was convicted were part of a single criminal episode. The events 
were closely connected in time and were executed with a single criminal purpose and therefore 
represent a single criminal act. 
In addition, caselaw which is analogous to this case supports the conclusion that the 
Aggravated Robbery statute provides alternate means of proving that an aggravated robbery has 
occurred. The Aggravated Robbery statute allows enhancement of the Robbery statute for 
sentencing purposes, but each enhancing factor does not create a new crime. 
The reasoning in Finlayson supports the conclusion that only one aggravated robbery 
occurred in this case. The addition of the taking of an operable motor vehicle is inherent in and 
contemplated by the Aggravated Robbery statute and the taking of the vehicle in this case 
specifically, does not make commission of the crime easier or lessen the risk of detection. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the Court for a finding that Counts One and Two of the 
information filed in this case are subject to merger and an order that Defendant's conviction for 
Count Two-Aggravated Robbery be vacated. 
DATED April 10, 2006. 
<L 
Nyal c . Bodily 
ALLAN & EASTON, LLC 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
ROY 
OF 
DRAKE 
UTAH, 
VS 
Plaintiff, ) 
IRVIN, JR., ) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 051904377 
BEFORE. THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1860 
MOTION 
MAY 11, 2006 FILED iiSTBiei COURT 
Th'rd Judicial District 
J & l 
D^OJ'y Cicr'' 
REPORTED BY: Matthew B. Rose, RPR, CSR 
(801) 238-7378 HL£J 
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solely on the nature of what's taken. 
And then the other point I want to make has to do 
with the robbery statute itself. The robbery statute requires 
"taking from the person or immediate presence of the person by 
force or fear." There was no force or fear used to take the 
money — or to take the money from the person that that money 
belonged to. And I don't know the gentleman's name, the store 
owner, nothing was taken from him by force or fear. That would 
be, as far as he is concerned, merely a theft. If money that 
belonged to him was taken from him and the person had the 
intent to permanently deprive him of it, there was a theft from 
that person. 
The only robbery that occurred was from the clerk. 
The money that was in her care and the car that was hers and 
that was one robbery. A continuing course of conduct, 
continuing fear where multiple things were taken, that's a 
single robbery. It's not a robbery of the person who owned the 
money. If anything, it's a theft. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Well, a very 
interesting question. I don't think the decision has to turn 
on whether you have one or two victims, or whether you have a 
victim who owns the money but wasn't there, or the property was 
taken from the person who had the responsibility of the money, 
an employee like in this case. I don't think the decision 
should turn on that. 
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Whether there were two separate crimes that are 
charged separately even though they may be in a single criminal 
episode -- and I look at a single criminal episode is just a 
procedural matter. Single criminal episode you try them all at 
once, if you can't you try them separately. But it seems to me 
the better rationale has to be here that certainly a robbery 
has to occur, and it can only occur when the property is taken 
from a person. 
In this case we have a — we have a robbery, and 
Mr. Irvin came into the store and he took the property that was 
owned by the store owner — who wasn't there, but under the 
care, custody or control of his employee who was there — by 
force or fear. I agree with the State at that point in time, 
that crime ends as far as the robbery is concerned. If 
something had have happened in the back room besides just 
taking her keys, then everybody agrees it would be another 
crime. But at that point in time, after the force and fear are 
necessary to get the cash out of the cash register is 
concluded, he takes her in the back room, the force and fear 
continues and she gives up the keys to her car. 
Now, granted it's the same person from whom the 
property was taken. If it wasn't, the second charge wouldn't 
be a robbery it would be something else. But her property was 
taken from her against her will by force or fear and that is 
her automobile. And I think that constitutes a separate crime. 
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And the reason I do say that is in the circumstances 
of this case, and each case turns on its own, factually anyway, 
but it just seems to me once the initial crime is completed, 
the robbery — taking the money by force and fear — is 
completed and then there 's a second type of property taken 
from — in this case, this is her personal property, this isnft 
her property that's being taken that she has charge of as an 
employee — and through force and fear, you!ve got a second 
crime. 
So accordingly I deny the defense motion, It?s an 
interesting question and perhaps it ought to be visited in the 
appellate courts and they111 certainly tell me if it is or not. 
I have no question about that. So in any event ITm going to 
deny the motion. When I sentence on this matter I111 be 
sentencing on two robberies. 
I'll ask the State to prepare an order. And please, 
in the order set forth what I've said here as to why I think 
State's position is correct so when the appellate court takes a 
look at it if they choose to they can see the order without any 
question and see why I did what I did. And if I'm wrong, then 
Ifm wrong. 
MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentleman. I!ll see you 
pretty soon. Sentencing is on the 9th of June? Yes. Okay. 
I111 see you then. 
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MR. FISHER: Very good, sir. Thank you. 
MR. BODILY: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 2:09 
p.m. ) 
• * * 
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Addendum C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
T. LANGDON FISHER, 5694 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROY DRAKE TRVIN, JR., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 051904377FS 
Hon. Timothy R. Hansen 
This Court presided over trial in the above-entitled matter on March 28-29, 2006. 
At the conclusion of that trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, including 
two counts of Aggravated Robbery. Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate 
Conviction for Aggravated Robbery, which came before this Court for hearing on May 
11, 2006. Present at said hearing were the defendant, his attorney, Nyal C. Bodily, and 
Deputy District Attorney T. Langdon Fisher. Prior to the hearing, the Court had received 
the defendant's motion and accompanying memorandum, and the State's response 
thereto. Oral arguments by both parties were presented in open court. Based on the 
evidence presented at trial and on the parties' memoranda and arguments, the Court 
enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
FILE! ifSTgJST CftUiT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN - 9 2008 
SALTlQte COUNTY j 
Q ' DepirtyCterJT 
State v. Roy Drake Irvin, Jr., court case no. 051904377 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 2 of 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant entered the Fastback Convenience Store in Salt Lake County ("the 
store" and held a knife against the store clerk, C.S. ("the victim"), to induce her to 
open the store cash register. The defendant then took money from the register that 
was under the victim's care and control, but which belonged to the store owner. 
2. Still in possession of the knife, the defendant then told the victim to give him her car 
keys. He then took her to the back of the store, talked about tying her up, and told her 
to stay in the back of the store when he left. These actions—taking the victim's car 
keys, removing her to the back of the store, talking about tying her up, and telling her 
to stay put—were committed to facilitate taking the victim's personal vehicle. The 
defendant left the building and drove away in the victim's personal vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Taking the money from the store cash register completed the first, separate offense of 
Aggravated Robbery. 
2. The defendant began a second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery when he took 
the victim's personal car keys, removed her to the back of the store, talked about 
tying her up, and told her to stay there. When he then took the victim's motor vehicle, 
the defendant completed the second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery. 
State v. Roy Drake Irvm, Jr., court case no. 051904377 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 3 of 3 
ORDER 
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law as outlined above, 
the defendant's Motion to Vacate Conviction for Aggravated Robbery is denied. 
DATED this 
READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Nyal C. Bodily 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Addendum D 
HOUSE BILL 185: CRIME INVOLVING A WEAPON 
Utah General Legislation Session 
Day 44, February 28, 1995 
CLERK: [House Bill] 185: Crime Involving a Weapon, by David M. Bresnahan. 
Committee votes 10 yes, zero no, 2 absent. 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Representative Bresnahan? 
REP. BRESNAHAN: Thank you Mr. Speaker. House Bill 185 is a very minor change to 
our existing statute regarding the firearms enhancement. The change, you will see on 
page 2 of the bill, on line 17, changing the word "firearm" to "dangerous weapon." This 
broadens the ability of our law enforcement people to deal with the ever-increasing 
problem of violent crime. This gives us the type of legislation that we have all talked 
about in getting tougher on violent criminals. On page one, you will note the definition of 
"a dangerous weapon" beginning on page - on line twenty, and it speaks to the fact that it 
is based on the way the weapon is used. So, in other words, "a dangerous weapon", for 
those that have had concerns, is not just simply that you've got a pocketknife in your 
pocket, it depends on how you use it. So, anything could be "a dangerous weapon" if you 
use it as such. 
The committee did change the number of years from seven back to the original 
five. And you will note the amended fiscal note has no fiscal impact. I appreciate your 
support on this bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to House Bill 185? (Pause) 
[There] being no further discussion, [we'll] go back to the sponsor for summation. 
REP. BRESNAHAN: Wave. 
MR. SPEAKER: Summation is waved. Voting is open on House Bill 185. 
(break in recording) 
Being all present and having voted, voting will be closed. House Bill 185 (inaudible) 67 
"yes" votes, zero "no" votes. Passes. [The matter will be] brought in before the Senate 
for their consideration. 
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ULC.A. 1953 § 76-1-401 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*si Chapter 1. General Provisions 
Kd Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
-»§ 76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined--Joinder of offenses and 
defendants 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing m this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-401; Laws 1975, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 127, 
eff. May 1, 1995. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Concurrent or consecutive sentences, limitations, see § 76-3-401. 
Multiple offenses filed in single court, see Rules Crim. Proc, Rule 9.5. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law €=^>29, 620. 
Double Jeopardy €=>139. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k29; 
C J S. Criminal Law §§ 14, 248, 255, 
C.J.S. Larceny §§ 53 to 54. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Burglary 9 
Controlled substances 10 
Driving offenses 7 
Due process 1 
Homicide 3 
Joinder and severance, generally 2 
Minors 11 
Possession of firearms 6 
Receiving stolen property 8 
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Westlaw 
UT ST § 76-1-402 Page 1 
U C.A. 1953 § 76-1-402 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*S Chapter 1. General Provisions 
M Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
-•§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted m a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of 
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such 
provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant 
is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation 
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein, or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
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necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the 
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Rights of accused persons, generally, see Const. Art. 1, § 12. 
Rights of defendant, see § 77-1-6. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law €==>29, 620. 
Double Jeopardy €^138, 139, 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 14, 
to 561. 
C.J.S. Larceny §§ 53 to 54. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
39 A.L.R.5th 283, Seizure or Detention for Purpose of Committing Rape, Robbery, or 
Other Offense as Constituting Separate Crime of Kidnapping. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 68, Multiple Offense Limitations. 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 84, Inchoate Offenses and Complicity-Multiple Offense 
Limitations. 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 103, Felony Murder-Multiple Offense Limitations. 
4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.1(A), Joinder: Related Offenses. 
4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.1(B), Joinder: Offenses of Similar 
Character. 
4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.2(A), Joinder of Defendants. 
4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.4(C), "Same Transaction" Joinder. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Double jeopardy, 
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F> 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 7 6. Utah Criminal Code 
i^ Chapter 1. General Provisions 
Kiai Part 6. Definitions 
-•§ 76-1-601. Definitions 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal 
action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(l) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; 
or 
( n ) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he 
is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the 
actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, 
partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or 
control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
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bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious 
bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information 
or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-601; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 1, 
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 205, § 
26, eff. April 29, 1996. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
"Hazing" defined, penalties, see § 76-5-107.5. 
Justification as defense, when allowed, see § 76-2-401. 
Offenses against property, arson, see § 76-6-102. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Assault and Battery €=>56, 58. 
Criminal Law €=>19 to 26. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 37k56; 37k58; 110kl9 to 110k26. 
C.J.S. Assault and Battery §§ 75, 77. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 31 to 44, 1110. 
C.J.S. Negligence §§ 913 to 914. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
5 A.L.R.5th 243, Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated 
Assault. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 86, Omissions-No Duty to Act. 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 87, Omissions-Impossibility Defense. 
1 Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1, Requirement of an Act 
1 Substantive Criminal Law § 6 2, Omission to Act. 
2 Substantive Criminal Law § 13 5, Enterprise Liability. 
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U C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203 8 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
K\i Chapter 3. Punishments 
M Part 2. Sentencing 
-•§ 76-3-203 8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used 
(1) As used m this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as in 
Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon 
was used m the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a) (l) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence applicable by 
law; and 
(n) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum term 
as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law in the case 
of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to the 
increases in punishment provided m Subsection (2) if the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used m the commission or furtherance of the felony; 
and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony m which a dangerous weapon was 
used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony and that person is 
subsequently convicted of another felony m which a dangerous weapon was used in 
the commission of or furtherance of the felony, the court shall, in addition to 
any other sentence imposed including those m Subsection (2) , impose an 
indeterminate prison term to be not less than five nor more than ten years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
Laws 2003, c. 148, § 4, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 276, § 2, eff. May 3, 
2004. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 7 6. Utah Criminal Code 
*ii Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*d Part 3. Robbery 
-•§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, 
he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined m Section 76-1- 601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course 
of committing a robbery' if it occurs m an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or m the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; 
Laws 1994, c. 271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 62, inserted m subsec. (1)(c) "or attempts to take". 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Body armor, increase of sentence if worn m violent felony, see § 76-3- 203.7. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Enhanced penalty, certain offenses committed by prisoner, see § 76-3-203.6. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Habitual violent offenders, definition and penalties, see § 76-3-203.5. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
-•RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing 
sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present 
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be 
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may 
be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment 
of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal 
shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. The 
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison 
and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
Article IV Relevancy and Its Limits 
•+RULE 403 EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The change in language is not 
one of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained m Rule 403 See 
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a 
more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise " See also Smith v Estelle, 445 F Supp 647 (N D Tex 1977) 
(surprise use of psychiatric testimony m capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the 
following Utah cases to the same effect Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), State v 
Johns, 615 P 2d 1260 (Utah 1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2d 93 (Utah 1982) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Pretrial disclosure of evidence, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 26 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Calhster, Chapman v State, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-An Issue of Admissibility or Credibility'?, 1983 
UtahL Rev 381 (1983) 
Cassell and Strassberg, Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child 
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